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1. Here is an example of a voter preference table to which we'll apply our various voting methods. The percentages of the voters is given across the top row (For example, 49% of the voters cast ballots of perference for A first, B second and C third). There are two "major" candidates and one on the "fringe." As you answer each question below, write a sentence or two explaining what you've done.

	49	48	3
1^{st}	A	В	С
2^{nd}	В	A	В
3^{rd}	С	С	Α

• Who wins with the *Plurality* Method?

• Who wins with the *Instant Run-off* Method?

• Give the *Round Robin* results below and decide the winner on that basis.

A vs B

A vs C

B vs C

• Let's reconfigure the table for the *Borda* Method. The first table has the number of votes, and the second has the number of points. Complete the table.

		Α	В	C
Votes:	1^{st}	49	48	3
votes.	2^{nd}	48		
	3^{rd}			

Points:

	A	В	С
1^{st}	147	144	9
2^{nd}			
3^{rd}			
Total Points			

Who wins using the *Borda* method?

2. Secret Gaming. Consider the same example as on the previous page. In order to depress the impact of the second-place votes for B, some of A's supporters cast votes which do not reflect their true preference; they rank C second and B third. These so-called "insincere" votes are indicated with bold type below:

	45	4	48	3
1^{st}	A	A	В	С
2^{nd}	В	\mathbf{C}	A	В
3^{rd}	С	В	С	Α

Fill out the new *Borda* votes and points tables below:

Votes:

	A	В	С
1^{st}	49	48	3
2^{nd}	48		
3^{rd}			

Points:

	A	В	С
1^{st}	147	144	9
2^{nd}			
3^{rd}			
Total Points			

Who wins using the *Borda* method?

3. Everybody games it! Not wanting to be vulnerable to strategic voting by the other major candidate, all the supporters of A and B cast insincere second place votes for C.

	49	48	3
1^{st}	A	В	С
2^{nd}	С	С	В
3^{rd}	В	A	Α

Fill out the *Borda* tables:

Votes:

	A	В	С
1^{st}	49	48	3
2^{nd}			
3^{rd}			

Points:

	A	В	С
1^{st}	147	144	9
2^{nd}			
3^{rd}			
Total Points			

Who wins using the *Borda* method?